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Abstract This paper proposes a theory of price discrimination based on consumer loss
aversion. A seller offers a menu of bundles before a consumer learns his willingness
to pay, and the consumer experiences gain–loss utility with reference to his prior
(rational) expectations about contingent consumption. With binary consumer types,
the seller finds it optimal to abandon screening under an intermediate range of loss
aversion if the low willingness-to-pay consumer is sufficiently likely. We also identify
sufficient conditions under which partial or full pooling dominates screening with a
continuum of types. Our predictions are consistent with several observed practices of
price discrimination.
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1 Introduction
When facing heterogeneous buyers, price discrimination allows a seller to capture a
larger portion of the total market surplus than offering a single product quality. Price
discrimination is prevalent, but sellers often employ just a small number of product
types, despite our casual and statistical observations that suggest significant hetero-
geneity among buyers’ willingness to pay. The lack of sufficient product variety has
been commonly attributed to the existence of some fixed costs of launching products
of different qualities (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1980). In many instances,
however, these costs tend to be small or immaterial, thereby making it difficult to
justify the observed patterns of firm strategy by resorting to such costs alone.
Motivated by these observations, this paper proposes a theory of price discrimi-
nation that incorporates a now well-established bias from rational decision making,
namely consumer loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Specifically, we intro-
duceKo˝szegi andRabin (2006) expectationmodel of reference-dependent preferences
into a standard screening model á la Mussa and Rosen (1978).1 In our setup, a monop-
olist seller offers a menu of bundles before a buyer privately observes his willingness
to pay and decides whether to make a purchase. As in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006),
henceforth referred to as KR, the buyer anticipates his future consumption choice
for each possible contingency and experiences “gain–loss utility” with reference to
his own past expectation of contingent consumption, in addition to standard “con-
sumption/intrinsic utility.” Furthermore, the expectation must be correct; that is, it
must be consistent with the buyer’s optimal consumption choice in each realization of
uncertainty. This requirement of rational expectation, or personal equilibrium (PE),
implies that the menu must satisfy incentive compatibility and (ex post) participation
constraints that account for reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion.2
In addition to the large existing literature documenting empirical support for loss
aversion in a variety of economic situations, a slew of recent studies point to the
specific role played by expectations in the formation of reference points (e.g., Mas
2006; Abeler et al. 2011; Card and Dahl 2011; Crawford and Meng 2011; Ericson and
Fuster 2011; Gill and Prowse 2012; Sprenger 2015). The price discrimination setting
offers a natural ground to explore the expectation-based approach to reference point
formation, because its essential ingredient is the uncertainty of consumer demand. We
usually know products that are available before discovering the specific conditions
that determine our preferences. Consider, for example, a sports fan whose willingness
1 Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007, 2009) extend their previous model to incorporate risky and intertemporal
decisions. Other models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences are analyzed by Bell (1985),
Loomes and Sugden (1986), Gul (1991), and Shalev (2000).
2 Our main results also hold under alternative time lines with ex ante participation.
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to pay for the sports TV package is influenced by the performance of his favorite team
during pre-season. This consumer may form an expectation that he would purchase
the premium package if and only if the team ends up having a promising pre-season.
But, once the regular season starts, he compares the expected purchase to what he
could have consumed.
We show that loss aversion indeed serves to limit the benefits of price discrimination
and can even result in the optimality of a full pooling menu in a situation where buyers
with standard preferences would be separated via a menu with strictly increasing
quality-price schedule. Moreover, the expectation-based approach brings into play an
additional determinant of optimal contractual form: It depends on an interplay between
the extent of consumer loss aversion and the shape of the distribution of consumer’s
willingness to pay. In particular, our results suggest that given a (sufficient) level of
loss aversion, the firm is more likely to shy away from screening in markets with large
population of consumers with low willingness to pay.
Our main message is most clearly conveyed in the case of binary consumer types,
where the effect of loss aversion manifests itself in two ways. First, when each con-
sumer compares the alternative of non-participation to the bundle of his choice ex post,
he experiences a loss on quality and a gain in money. Thus, as the consumer becomes
more loss averse, he becomes willing to pay more for a given quality, which implies
that the seller can profitably increase the quality for the type whose participation
constraint is binding (i.e., the low willingness-to-pay type).
Second, for the consumer who acquires an information rent (i.e., the high
willingness-to-pay type), deviation to lower quality-price bundle leads to another chan-
nel of gain–loss comparisons across the two utility dimensions. In this case, however,
the comparison isweighted by the ex ante likelihood of the alternative event. Given loss
aversion, the deviation incentive would be greater when the low willingness-to-pay
type, and thus a lower price, was anticipated with a larger probability.
The combination of the above two effects generates the following: When the like-
lihood of low willingness-to-pay consumer is sufficiently large and the degree of loss
aversion lies in an intermediate range, the seller’s optimal strategy is to offer the same
bundle to both types.3 In the case of a continuum of consumer types, focusing on
the case in which full separation is optimal under standard preferences, we establish
conditions under which partial or even full pooling is optimal among menus with
monotone quality and price.
In our model, multiple personal equilibria may arise from a menu. Our treatment
above follows the standard mechanism design approach by assuming that the firm can
select the PE and hence focusing on truthful self-selection. An alternative approach
suggested by KR is to assume that it is the consumer who is capable of choosing his
favorite PE, or the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE). We derive the optimal menu
under the concept of PPE and binary consumer types, and show that a pooling menu
continues to be optimal under a wide range of parameter values. To our knowledge,
this is the first non-trivial analysis of PPE in a model of adverse selection to date.
3 When the buyer is very loss averse, a reverse-screening menu, where the low consumer type purchases a
higher quality-price bundle than the high consumer type, can be made incentive feasible and even optimal.
However, this result does not hold when there is a continuum of types. See Sect. 3.2.
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Our paper contributes to the growing literature on firm behavior under bound-
edly rational agents (see the surveys of Ellison 2006; Spiegler 2011; Ko˝szegi 2014).
Among this literature, monopolist’s screening problems with loss averse consumers
have recently been studied independently by Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), Orhun
(2009), and Carbajal and Ely (2016).
Herweg andMierendorff (2013) consider a seller who chooses from two-part tariffs
for a loss averse consumer with uncertain demand and demonstrate the optimality of
flat tariff. They model the consumer also in the frame of KR, but with gain–loss
arising only from the money dimension, and characterize optimal contract when the
consumer can commit to ex ante participation. Our analysis differs in several aspects.
First, our setup allows for both ex post and ex ante participation. Second, we consider
a general class of menus under gain–loss utilities that arise from both money and
quality dimensions and derive the precise channel via which consumer loss aversion
generates bunching over quality as well as price. Moreover, our treatment of gain–loss
utility gives rise to non-trivial PPE analysis.
In Orhun (2009) and Carbajal and Ely (2016), the seller offers amenu to a consumer
who already knows his type and admits an exogenously given reference point that is
type-dependent. These authors also demonstrate the possibility of optimal pooling.
However, their utility models do not involve gain–loss comparisons across multiple
types; moreover, the issue of optimal menus that are PE (PPE) is not explored. The
main concern ofCarbajal andEly (2016) is to explain how the shape of optimal contract
depends on the reference point.
Loss aversion has been fruitfully incorporated in other contexts of firm behavior.
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014), Spiegler (2012), and Rosato (2013) consider monopoly
pricing with complete information. In these models, the monopolist can optimally
commit to a random pricing strategy. In contrast, we explore the role of loss aversion
in a model with demand uncertainty and menu contracts. The consumer’s expectations
concern his future demand, not the price realization. Courty and Nasiry (2015) derive
the uniformity of optimal price irrespective of product quality in a monopoly model
with consumer loss aversion and random utility shocks. They do not however address
the issue of screening as we do here.
Also using the KR model, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) explain why firms with
differentiated products and heterogeneous costs may end up charging a uniform price.
The competition model of differentiated products is also explored by Karle and Peitz
(2013) and Zhou (2011). DeMeza andWebb (2007) andHerweg et al. (2010) study the
role of loss aversion in agency problems. In auctions, loss averse bidders are introduced
by Lange and Ratan (2010) and Eisenhuth (2010), and Grillo (2013) considers a cheap
talk game in which the receiver is loss averse.
Finally, our paper complements other approaches aimed at understanding the impli-
cations of biased consumers formonopolist behavior. Time-inconsistent preferences or
self-control problems have been explored in the context of contract design by DellaV-
igna and Malmendier (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Esteban et al. (2007) and
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010); Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) and Grubb (2009) inves-
tigate the role of overconfident consumers. Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) show that
pooling menu could be optimal in an insurance model with adverse selection if the
consumer has imprecise belief about the underlying risk. Here, optimal pooling arises
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if the likelihood of low risk consumer is sufficiently large; however, this parameter
also affects the corresponding insurance coverage, while in our optimal pooling menu
the product quality depends on the degree of loss aversion and not on the distribution
of willingness to pay.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a price discrimination setup
with KR’s reference-dependent preferences for the binary-type case. In Sect. 3, we
characterize the optimal menu in our model by adopting truthful personal equilibrium
as the solution concept. The optimal menu under preferred personal equilibrium is
characterized in Sect. 4. We discuss some alternative models of reference points, and
their consequences, in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
“Appendix” unless mentioned otherwise. We also present the details of some omitted
analyses in a Supplementary Material.
2 The setup
2.1 Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
Consider a market that consists of a monopolistic seller of some product and its buyer.
Let b = (q, t) denote a “bundle” in which the product of quality q is sold for the
payment of t . A “menu” of bundles is referred to as M ⊆ R2+. We refer to ∅ = (0, 0)
as the null bundle, or outside option. The seller’s profit from a bundle b = (q, t) is
t − cq, where c > 0 is the constant marginal cost of production. There is no cost of
offering a bundle.
The buyer’s willingness to pay for the product, or “type,” θ ∈ Θ is unknown at
the time of menu offer from the seller but later learned privately at the time of actual
consumption. Let F denote the commonly known cumulative distribution function on
Θ .
Upon observing menu M , but before learning his type, the buyer forms a “reference
point,” R : Θ → M ∪ {∅}, which specifies a (deterministic) contingent plan of
purchase at each possible type realization (including the possibility of opting out). Let
R(θ ′) = (qr (θ ′), tr (θ ′)) for each θ ′ ∈ Θ . Given reference point R, type-θ buyer’s ex
post utility from consuming bundle b = (q, t) is given by the sum of two components,
“consumption/intrinsic” utility and “gain–loss” utility,” as follows4:
u(b | θ, R) := m(b; θ) +
∫
θ ′∈Θ
n(b; θ, θ ′, R(θ ′))dF(θ ′), (1)
where
– the consumption/intrinsic utility is measured by
m(b; θ) := θv(q) − t
4 To adjust themagnitude of gain–loss utility relative to consumptionutility,we could introduce a parameter,
say β, and multiply it to the gain–loss utility term. Here, we set β equal to 1 for simplicity; the qualitative
features of our results remain the same for any β provided it is not too small.
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such that v(·) is a (differentiable) function satisfying v(0) = 0, v′(·) > 0,v′′(·) <
0, limq→0v′(q) = ∞ and limq→∞v′(q) = 0; and
– the gain–loss utility is given by
n(b; θ, θ ′, R(θ ′)) := μ (θv(q) − θ ′v(qr (θ ′))) + μ (tr (θ ′) − t) , (2)
where μ is an indicator function such that, for any k1, k2 ∈ R+,
μ(k1 − k2) :=
{
k1 − k2 if k1 ≥ k2
λ(k1 − k2), λ > 1 if k1 < k2.
The utility function in (1) adapts the model of KR to our price discrimination
setting. Note that the overall gain–loss utility here is measured in expectation over
the uncertainty surrounding the payoff type of the decision maker rather than the
randomness of outcomes per se (for each type, the reference bundle is deterministic).
Each type-θ buyer compares himself with another hypothetical type θ ′; as such, type-
θ buyer experiences gain–loss from the difference between his bundle and that of
each hypothetical type θ ′ in terms of final utilities. Following Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) andKo˝szegi andRabin (2006), we assume that the gain–loss utility is additively
separable across the two consumption dimensions, quality and monetary transfer. In
Sect. 5, we formally discuss how our utility formulation differs from some alternative
formulations of reference point in the price discrimination setup.
The following time line will be useful to illustrate the model and compare it with
the standard screening model.5
Time
The seller oﬀers a menu;
The buyer forms a reference point
θ realized The buyer chooses/consumes
a (no) bundle from the menu
2.2 Personal equilibrium
We now introduce the notion of personal equilibrium proposed by KR, which incor-
porates the idea that the reference point formed by an economic agent should be in
accordance with his actual choices.
Definition 1 Given any menu M , R : Θ → M ∪ {∅} is a personal equilibrium (PE)
if, for all θ ∈ Θ ,
u(R(θ)|θ, R) ≥ u(b|θ, R), ∀b ∈ M ∪ {∅}. (3)
We say that R is a truthful personal equilibrium (TPE) if it is a PE given M = R.
Condition (3) requires that each bundle R(θ) in the PE be optimal for type θ with
R as the reference point so that R(θ) is the bundle the buyer actually chooses if his
5 Although we consider a model with ex post participation, our central message holds also under other time
lines with ex ante participation. See Sect. 6 for a further discussion.
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type turns out to be θ . Note that the equilibrium utility of each type must be no lower
than its utility from choosing the null option since the buyer can always opt out after
the realization of his type.
In the case of a TPE, the reference point itself is offered as a menu and therefore
each type only needs to prefer his choice of bundle over the other type’s bundle or the
null bundle. That is, R is a TPE if and only if the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality requirements hold as follows: For each θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ ,
u(R(θ)|θ, R) ≥ u(R(θ ′)|θ, R) (ICθ )
u(R(θ)|θ, R) ≥ u(∅|θ, R). (IRθ )
Since these inequalities, henceforth referred to as the (IC) and (IR) constraints, are
implied by (3), the following result is immediate.
Proposition 1 Suppose R is a personal equilibrium (PE) of some menu M. Then, R
is a truthful personal equilibrium (TPE).
This result is a version of revelation principle since it implies that it is without loss to
focus on direct menus, i.e., menus in which every bundle is purchased in equilibrium.
The concept of personal equilibrium is not robust to the problem ofmultiple equilib-
ria, however.When the seller offers a TPEmenu R, the buyermight form an alternative
reference point R′ = R and play it as a PE so that the seller fails to achieve the desired
outcome. Moreover, the alternative PE could give the buyer a higher ex ante expected
utility than the TPE. It is possible that the TPE generates a negative ex ante utility
with there being another PE in which the buyer does not buy at all.
One approach to resolve the issue of multiple PEs proposed by KR is to assume
that the consumer always chooses the PE that maximizes his ex ante expected utility,
or the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE). Let P(M) denote the set of all PEs that
can arise when the seller offers a menu M ; that is, R belongs to P(M) if R ⊆ M ∪{∅}
and R satisfies condition (3). Also, given a menu R, let U (R) denote the buyer’s




u(R(θ) | θ, R)dF(θ).
Definition 2 Given any menu M , R : Θ → M ∪ {∅} is a preferred personal equilib-
rium (PPE) if R ∈ P(M) and U (R) ≥ U (R′) for all R′ ∈ P(M). We say that R is a
truthful preferred personal equilibrium (TPPE) if it is a PPE given M = R.
We characterize the seller’s profit-maximizing menu of bundles under both notions
PE and PPE. In Sect. 3, the seller is assumed to be able to select his favorite PE from the
menu that he offers; in Sect. 4, the buyer selects the PPE. While it may be unrealistic
to assume that the seller can always manipulate the consumer’s beliefs, it also seems
plausible that some consumers would respond naively to the menu on the table when
he forms beliefs about his future contingent actions.
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In both treatments, we restrict attention to the set of direct menus by focusing on
TPE and TPPE. This is without loss for the analysis of PE menu due to Proposition 1,
but a similar revelation principle for PPE menus may not hold. To see this, suppose
that R is a PPE given some menu M = R. It is possible that R is not a PPE given
itself—that is, R is not a TPPE—because we cannot a priori rule out the existence of
some R′ ∈ P(R) that does not belong toP(M) and generates a higher ex ante expected
utility. This failure of revelation principle poses a great challenge for complete analysis
of optimal menu design since such analyses rely critically on the revelation principle,
as well known from the mechanism design literature. We address this issue in more
detail in Sect. 4.3.
3 Optimal TPE menu
3.1 Binary consumer types
We begin by characterizing the seller’s optimal PE menu for the case of binary con-
sumer types. Let Θ = {θL , θH } such that 0 < θL < θH . The probability measure on
θL is denoted by p ∈ (0, 1). For ease of exposition, we refer to a reference point in
this case simply as R := {rL , rH } where ri = (qri , tri ) for i = H, L .6
3.1.1 The seller’s problem
Proposition 1 implies that the set of PE menus is equivalent to the set of TPE menus
and hence there is no loss in restricting ourselves to menus that are themselves TPEs.
We sometimes refer to such a menu simply as a TPE menu and let M denote the set
of all TPE menus. The seller’s problem, denoted as [P], is given by
max
{(qL ,tL ),(qH ,tH )}∈M
p(tL − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH − cqH ). [P]
Under the reference-dependent preference framework, a broader class of menus
can be supported as TPEs, compared to the standard screening model. In particular,
it is possible to have the low-type buyer purchasing the higher quality-price bundle
and vice versa. Given such a menu, the high type suffers a loss from deviating to
mimic the low type and paying more than anticipated, and this no longer supports the
usual incentive compatibility argument for the necessity of quality monotonicity of a
feasible menu.
One class of menus that can be easily ruled out is one where one type of buyer
receives a lower quality but pays more than the other type (including the case of a
higher payment for the same quality or the same payment for a lower quality). The
reason is simple: If the former type deviates to the latter’s bundle, then he will enjoy
a higher gain–loss utility as well as a higher intrinsic utility.
6 When we write a menu as an ordered pair of two bundles, the first (second) element refers to the bundle
consumed by the low (high) type. When the two elements are the same and equal to r , with slight abuse of
notation, we sometimes write the corresponding menu simply as {r}.
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We are therefore left with the following three classes of menus to consider.
1. Pooling menu qH = qL and tH = tL
2. Screening menu qH > qL and tH > tL
3. Reverse-screening menu qH < qL and tH < tL
We let MP , MS , and MR denote the set of pooling, screening, and reverse-
screening menus, respectively, that satisfy the (IC) and (IR) constraints. For the full
expressions of these constraints, see Section S.1 of the Supplementary Material.
3.1.2 Symmetric information benchmark
Before the main analysis, we examine the optimal menu when the seller and buyer
are symmetrically informed. This will give us an insight into how the informational
asymmetry interacts with loss aversion to generate the optimality of pooling. Consider
a profit-maximizing sellerwho is symmetrically informedof θ and thus can commit to a
menu ex ante such that she imposes (qi , ti ) upon observing each type θi being realized.
Specifically, we modify the seller’s problem [P] by dropping the (IC) constraints. Let
us denote by [Ps ] the seller’s profitmaximization problem among contracts that satisfy
the (IR) constraints only.
The following result gives a necessary condition for the optimal menu with sym-
metric information.
Lemma 1 The solution to [Ps] must be such that θHv(qH ) ≥ θLv(qL) and tH ≥ tL .
Using the above Lemma and the fact that both (IR) constraints are binding, we
obtain
tL = (λ + 1)
2




B(p, λ) := 1 + (1 − p) + pλ
1 + p + (1 − p)λ . (5)
Here, B(p, λ) measures the relative impact of loss aversion on deviation incentives in
our model, where gain–loss utilities arise stochastically in both quality and monetary
dimensions. Deviating from purchasing the reference bundle to the null bundle induces
a loss in quality but a gain in money. Notice that B(p, 1) = 1.
Assuming θHv(qH ) > θLv(qL) at the optimum,7 we can plug (4) into the objective
function and take the first-order conditions to obtain
c
v′(qL)








7 It is possible to have θH v(qH ) = θLv(qL ) at the optimum. We ignore this case to ease the exposition.
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Note from (6) and (7) that qL ≥ qH if and only if





which holds for λ exceeding some threshold since (λ+1)B(p, λ) strictly increases in
λ without bound. Thus, with λ high enough to satisfy (8), the symmetrically informed
seller canmaximize profit by endowing the low type with a higher quality but charging
the high type with a larger transfer (see (4)). Note that the optimal qualities are the
same across the two types only when (8) holds as equality, which is a knife-edge phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, the same quality does not necessarily mean the same transfer.
This implies that pooling menu, which is the main focus of our analysis, does not
arise when the buyers are loss averse but do not hold private information. Neither does
it emerge as a consequence of asymmetric information alone, as in Mussa and Rosen
(1978). The optimality of pooling is indeed a consequence of the interplay between loss
aversion and asymmetric information, as we demonstrate in later sections. Intuitively,
pooling will emerge as the optimal menu when the quality reversal is desirable due to
loss aversion but is not feasible in the presence of asymmetric information.
3.1.3 Results
We now turn to the analysis of [P], i.e., finding an optimal menu when the seller and
buyer are asymmetrically informed. A unified analysis of all possible menus is not
available since different classes of menus entail different forms of gain–loss utility.
Our analysis below considers each class separately to identify an optimal menu within
that class, which will then lead us to characterize the overall optimal menu. Note that
any pooling menu lies on the boundary of the set of feasible screening menus (MS)
or reverse-screening menus (MR). The optimality of pooling will thus arise if two
inequality constraints, qH ≥ qL and qH ≤ qL , which we impose to find an optimal
menu within MS and MR , turn out to be binding. In what follows, whenever we
mention an “optimal screening (pooling or reverse-screening) menu,” it will mean
optimality within the set of screening (pooling or reverse-screening) menus.
Pooling menu Webegin by characterizing the seller’s profit-maximizing choicewithin
the class of the pooling menu. Consider a pooling menu R = {r = (q, t)} ∈ MP .
Clearly, the (IRH ) constraint is implied by the (IRL) constraint since, if both types
choose the same bundle, type θH is better off in terms of both intrinsic and gain–loss
utilities while the outside payoff is type-independent. Now, (IRL) can be written as
u(r |θL , R) = θLv(q) − t − (1 − p)λ(θH − θL)v(q)
≥ u(∅|θL , R) = p[t − λθLv(q)] + (1 − p)[t − λθHv(q)],
or after rearrangement,




Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
Clearly, (9) must be binding at the optimum. The following result is then immediate
from the first-order condition of the seller’s profit maximization.
Proposition 2 The optimal pooling menu, {(q p, t p)}, is such that θLv′(q p) = 2cλ+1 .
Thus, the seller finds it optimal to sell a higher quality to a consumer with higher λ.
This is because the buyer wants to avoid the loss from non-participation and, therefore,
is willing to pay more for a given amount of consumption if he is more loss averse, as
can be seen in (9) above.
Screening menu Consider a screening menu R = {rL = (qL , tL), rH = (qH , tH )} ∈
MS where qL < qH and tL < tH . As in the standard screening model, we can
show that the (ICH ) and (IRL) constraints are binding at the optimum while the other
constraints are not. Using a similar derivation to (9), the (IRL) constraint can bewritten
as
tL ≤ λ + 1
2
θLv(qL), (10)
which must be binding at the optimum. Thus, for the same reason as in the optimal
pooling menu above, the optimal quality for the low type increases with loss aversion.
We refer to this as the participation effect of loss aversion, meaning that a greater
aversion to the loss resulting from comparison with non-participation enables the
seller to charge more and thus increase the quality for the low-type consumer.
Next, write the (ICH ) constraint as
u(rH |θH , R) = θHv(qH ) − tH + p[θHv(qH ) − θLv(qL) − λ(tH − tL)]
≥ u(rL |θH , R) = θHv(qL) − tL + p(θH − θL)v(qL)
+ (1 − p)[(tH − tL) − λθH (v(qH ) − v(qL))],
which can then be rewritten as
[1 + (1 − p) + pλ](tH − tL) ≤ [1 + p + (1 − p)λ]θH [v(qH ) − v(qL)]. (11)
The benefit of type θH deviating to rL , captured by the LHS of (11), consists of
reduced payment, tH − tL , and its positive impact on the gain–loss utility, (1 − p +
pλ)(tH − tL). To understand the latter, note first that the gain from paying tL instead
of tH is weighted by the probability 1− p with which the buyer expected the payment
to be tH . At the same time, by the deviation, the high type avoids the loss equal to
λ(tH − tL) that he would have incurred from sticking with his equilibrium choice,
which is weighted by the probability p with which θL would have occurred.
The cost of deviation, captured by the RHS of (11), results from a reduced quality
from qH to qL and can be explained similarly. One can then see that B(p, λ) =
1+(1−p)+pλ
1+p+(1−p)λ , defined previously in (5), reflects the relative (benefit–cost) impact factor
of deviating to a lower quality, lower price bundle, which would result in a monetary
gain but a quality loss.
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When binding, (11) can be written as
tH = tL + θH [v(qH ) − v(qL)]
B(p, λ)
. (12)
Notice from (11) that higher λ amplifies both the benefit and cost of deviation. If a
higher λ makes B(p, λ) larger (smaller), then the loss aversion makes screening less
(more) effective in enabling the extraction of more payment from the high type. We
will refer to this as the screening effect of loss aversion, which could be favorable or
adverse to the seller depending on the value of p. Also, (12) implies that, for fixed λ,
the effectiveness of screening is decreasing in the likelihood of low type, i.e., B(p, λ)
is increasing in p.
Now, we describe the optimal screening menu and compare it with the optimal
pooling menu.















where qsL , if not equal to 0, increases in λ and q
s
H decreases (increases) in λ if
p > 12 (p <
1
2 ).









which in turn holds if and only if λ ≥ λS for some threshold λS > 1 that decreases
in p and increases in θH
θL
.
In part (a) of Proposition 3, the optimal quality qL increasing with λ should be
expected from the participation effect. The behavior of qH is related to the fact that
B(p, λ) increases with λ if and only if p > 12 : That is, a higher λ means the adverse





Part (b) states the condition under which pooling dominates screening. The inequal-
ity (15) holds when the participation effect, measured by λ+12 [see (10) above], is large
and/orwhen the screening effect works against the profitability of screening as B(p, λ)
gets large. There are a couple of noteworthy observations here. First, with sufficiently
large λ, the dominance of pooling over screening remains even when p < 12 such
that the screening effect works favorably for the screening seller. This is because the
participation effect dominates the screening effect, namely λ+12 increases with λ faster





, is decreasing in p, and
this implies that screening is less attractive relative to pooling when the low-type con-
sumers are more abundant. This follows from the fact that a higher (ex ante) likelihood
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of θL generates a greater deviation incentive for the high type via the gain–loss utility
(∂ B(p, λ)/∂p > 0).
Reverse-screening menu Let us consider next a reverse-screening menu R = {rL =
(qL , tL), rH = (qH , tH )} ∈ MR such that qL > qH and tL > tH , satisfying the
(IC) and (IR) constraints. The reverse-screening menu is a useful device to exploit the
aforementioned participation effect by giving a higher quality to the low type. Giving
a higher quality to the low type, however, may create a deviation incentive for the high
type. This incentive can be curbed should the high type suffer a sufficient loss from a
higher deviation price. How this loss is affected by the parameters in our model will
determine when the reverse-screening menu is optimal.
We first provide a couple of necessary conditions for reverse-screening menu to be
feasible or optimal.
Lemma 2 (a) A reverse-screening menu can be a TPE only if
θH
θL
≤ λ + 1
2
. (16)
(b) Any optimal reverse-screening menu must satisfy θHv(qH ) ≥ θLv(qL).
Part (a) states that loss aversion must be high enough to sustain a reverse-screening
menu as a TPE. According to part (b), the seller does not want to reverse the qualities
to the extent that the utility from quality consumption is reversed.
We now compare reverse-screening and pooling menus.
Proposition 4 Any reverse-screening menu is dominated by the optimal pooling menu
if and only if
θH
θL
≥ 1 + p + (1 − p)λ
2
, (17)




Thus, if λ is large enough to violate (17), reverse-screening in fact dominates
pooling. This arises due to the participation effect that makes the increase in qL , rather
than qH , more effective in extracting surplus. Since the high-type consumer derives
a higher level of utility from any given contract and therefore cares less about an
improvement in quality than the low-type consumer, the attractiveness of exploiting
the high type’s higher marginal intrinsic utility can be outweighed by the participation
effect when the consumer is significantly loss averse.
Condition (17) shows that pooling tends to dominate reverse-screening as p gets
larger. The logic is similar to that behind part (b) of Proposition 3: A higher p makes
it more tempting for the high type to deviate. When the realization of the low type has
been anticipated to bemore likely, under screening, the high type experiences a greater
loss from sticking to rH that involves a higher payment while, under reverse-screening,
the same consumer finds it less costly to deviate to rL .
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Optimal menu Weare now ready to characterize themenu thatmaximizes the expected
profit among all TPE menus.
Theorem 1 There exists some pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that λS ≤ λR if and only if p ≥ pˆ.
Then, the optimal menu that solves [P] is
(a) a pooling menu if p ≥ pˆ and λ ∈ [λS, λR];
(b) a screening menu if λ < min{λR, λS};
(c) a reverse-screening menu if λ > max{λR, λS};
(d) either screening or reverse-screening menu (but not both) if p < pˆ and λ ∈
[λR, λS].
Proof First, it is straightforward to see that
lim
p→0 λS = ∞ >
2θH
θL
− 1 = lim
p→0 λR
lim




− 1 < ∞ = lim
p→1 λR .
Thus, by the mean value theorem and the monotonicity of λS and λR , we can find
pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that λS ≥ λR if and only if p ≥ pˆ. Then, parts (a) to (d) of the claim
immediately follow from combining part (b) of Propositions 3 and 4. unionsq
Pooling is optimal if there is enough mass of low types and the consumer is suffi-
ciently, but not too, loss averse. Otherwise, a screening or reverse-screening menu is
optimal. In the latter case, there is a region of parameters, as shown in part (d), in which
we have not been able to fully sort between screening and reverse-screening menus,
but in most cases we expect the screening (reverse-screening) menu to be optimal if λ
is low (high).
The central message of Theorem 1 is the optimality of pooling. Another noteworthy
theoretical prediction of ourmodel is the possibility of optimal reverse-screening under
sufficiently large λ. We nonetheless show below that this latter result does not hold in
a model with a continuum of buyer types [Theorem 2, part (c)] or with an alternative
gain–loss utility specification (Proposition 7).
The following example illustrates how the optimal menu varies with the parameter
values. Here, pooling is optimal for a wide range of parameter values, while reverse-
screening requires λ to be larger than 2.8
Example 1 Suppose that θH
θL
= 1.5. Figure 1 divides the space of (λ, p) into four
regions according to Theorem 1 and illustrates the type of optimal menu in each
region.
8 Estimates of loss aversion have been obtained in a variety of contexts, ranging from 1.3 to 2.7; see
(Camerer 2006). However, these estimates do not translate directly to values of λ in our setup since they
are measured only in terms of money. A high level of λ may also be unrealistic on theoretical grounds.
For example, lottery decisions of an individual modeled along Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) violate first-order
stochastic dominance for high λ (e.g., Masatlioglu and Raymond 2016).
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Fig. 1 Optimal TPE menu
It can be shown, though only numerically, that in the region (d), there is a threshold
value of λ for each p below (above) which the screening (reverse-screening) menu is
optimal. Below dotted line, the optimal screening menu entails exclusion of the buyer
with low willingness to pay [see (13) above].9
Notice in the above example that, at low values of p, loss aversion actually generates
a benefit from serving also the low-type buyer who would otherwise be excluded by
the profit-maximizing seller. This is due to the participation effect that enables the
firm to sell a higher quality-price bundle to the low type than in the model without
loss aversion.10
3.2 A continuum of consumer types
In this section, we explore the scope of our findings beyond binary consumer types by
considering a continuum-type case. Section S.2 of the SupplementaryMaterial offers a
detailed analysis, including formal proofs and numerical examples of the main results.
Suppose that θ ∈ [θ, θ ]with a cdf F , which has a strictly positive and continuously
differentiable pdf f . Define the “virtual value” function as
J (θ) := θ − 1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
,
9 In the optimal reverse-screening menu, however, neither type is excluded. To see this, note that by
definition of reverse-screening, qL > qH , and also that by Lemma 2(b), qL > 0 implies qH > 0.
10 This observation demonstrates an important distinction between our theory and an alternative explanation
of coarse price discrimination based on fixed menu costs. In contrast to our predictions, when p is low,
menu cost would have no bite since the seller would serve only the high-type customers even without it.
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and assume that it is strictly increasing. Without loss aversion, this assumption leads
to full separation of types.
Let (q, t) : [θ, θ ] → R+ × R denote a menu offered by the seller. For simplicity,
we assume that q(·) and t (·) are continuous.11 We restrict attention to two classes of
monotone menus: (i) both q(·) and t (·) are non-decreasing; and (ii) both q(θ) and t (θ)
are non-increasing while θv(θ) is non-decreasing. With some abuse of terminology,
we refer to the former class of menus as screening menus and the latter as reverse-
screening menus.
Given a feasible TPE menu, with some abuse of notation, let U (θ ′; θ) denote the
payoff of type θ reporting θ ′ and let U (θ) := U (θ; θ). Then, the (IC) constraint can
be written as
U (θ) = max
θ ′∈[θ,θ ]
U (θ ′; θ), ∀θ, (18)




(t (s) − λsv(q(s)))dF(s), ∀θ. (19)
In both screening and reverse-screening menus we consider, θv(q(θ)) is non-
decreasing and, hence, we can define
θˆ (θ, θ ′) := sup{r ∈ [θ, θ ] | sv(q(s)) ≤ θv(q(θ ′)), ∀s ≤ r}.
Note that if type θ (mis)reports to be type θ ′ and receives q(θ ′), he experiences a utility
gain (loss) in quality dimension, compared to the types below (above) θˆ (θ; θ ′).
We can then write
U (θ ′; θ) = θv(q(θ ′)) − t (θ ′) +
[∫ θˆ (θ,θ ′)
θ









(sv(q(s)) − θv(q(θ ′)))dF(s) +
∫ θ ′
θ
(t (θ ′) − t (s))dF(s)
]
.
11 If the optimal schedule involves some jump(s), then it will manifest itself as a boundary solution of the
optimization program since any such schedule can be approximated by a sequence of continuous schedules.
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The first-order condition for incentive compatibility amounts to the following12:
∂
∂θ ′
U (θ ′; θ)
∣∣∣∣
θ ′=θ
= θ (v(q(θ)))′ [1 + F(θ)
+λ(1 − F(θ))] − t ′(θ) [1 + (1 − F(θ)) + λF(θ)] = 0. (20)
To see the intuition behind this expression, consider the cost and benefit of type
θ from slightly overstate his type. On the one hand, the intrinsic utility from quality
consumption marginally increases by θ(v(q(θ)))′. From this, the gain that type θ
enjoys relative to the types below increases by θ(v(q(θ)))′F(θ) while the loss, which
type θ suffers relative to the types above, decreases by λθ(v(q(θ)))′(1− F(θ)). Thus,
the overall marginal benefit in the quality dimension is proportional to 1 + F(θ) +
λ(1 − F(θ)). On the other hand, due to a higher payment after the deviation, the
intrinsic utility decreases by t ′(θ). From this, the gain that type θ enjoys relative to
the types above decreases by t ′(θ)(1− F(θ)) while the loss increases by λt ′(θ)F(θ).
Thus, the overall marginal benefit in the money dimension is proportional to 1+ (1−
F(θ)) + λF(θ).
We can rewrite (20) as
t ′(θ) = (v(q(θ)))′ θ(1 + F(θ) + λ(1 − F(θ)))
1 + (1 − F(θ)) + λF(θ) = (v(q(θ)))
′G(θ, λ), (21)
where
G(θ, λ) := θ
H(θ, λ)
and H(θ, λ) := 1 + (1 − F(θ)) + λF(θ)
1 + F(θ) + λ(1 − F(θ)) .
Note that H(θ, λ) is the continuum-type counterpart of B(p, λ) in (12). It affects the
rate at which the payment increases as the consumer’s type, and thus its corresponding
quality marginally increases. Without reference-dependent utility, the rate of increase
is proportional to G(θ, 1) = θ ; this should be adjusted using H(θ, λ) in the presence
of reference-dependent utility. We refer to G(θ, λ) as the “gain–loss-adjusted type,”
whose behavior is crucial for determining the optimal quality schedule. Note that








), so the gain–loss-
adjusted type is leveled out. Moreover, H(θ, λ) increases in θ and does so faster with
higher λ, which may cause G(θ, λ) = θH(θ,λ) to decrease.
We next present our results of this section.
Theorem 2 Consider the case of a continuum of consumer types, and restrict attention
to monotone menus. The optimal TPE menu has the following properties:
12 Note that this condition only considers local incentive compatibility. With standard preferences, global
incentive compatibility is usually guaranteed by the nonnegative cross derivative of U (θ ′; θ), but this latter
property may not hold under reference dependence. Here, one can verify global incentive compatibility
directly from the solution menu satisfying (20), or impose certain parametric assumptions. Also, global
incentive compatibility trivially holds if the optimal schedule is constant.
123
J.-H. Hahn et al.





. Then, pooling occurs around the highest type θ .
(b) Suppose that θ > 0, θ f (θ) > F(θ) ∀θ , and f ′(θ) ≤ 0 ∀θ . Then, there exists some
λ > 1 such that, for any λ > λ, pooling occurs over the entire interval [θ, θ ].
(c) Any reverse-screening menu is dominated by a pooling menu.
In part (a), condition (i) guarantees that a quality-transfer schedule that deters
deviation to a marginal type does so to all other types and hence global incentive com-
patibility is implied by local consideration.13 Condition (ii) is equivalent to requiring
that Gθ (θ, λ) < 0, i.e., the gain–loss-adjusted type decreases with the original type
around the top. Without having to concern with information rent at the top, this means
that the gain–loss-adjusted virtual value also decreases, leading to pooling at the top.
Note that the inequality never holds if λ = 1.
Part (b) gives a set of conditions sufficient for full pooling to be optimal. The first
condition, θ > 0, prevents the optimal menu from excluding the bottom type, as
required by a full pooling menu. To understand the second condition, let us first note
lim




Thus, for sufficiently high λ, the gain–loss-adjusted type decreases going from θ to θ
while it may not be in between. Then, the condition that θ f (θ) > F(θ) ∀θ ensures
that this expression monotonically decreases over the entire interval so that Gθ (θ, λ)
is always negative for sufficiently high λ. The last condition, f ′(θ) ≤ 0, ensures
(along with the second condition) that Gθθ (θ) ≤ 0 for sufficiently high λ, which
means worsening of the information rent problem due to loss aversion. Note that this
condition is consistent with the observation in the previous binary-type analysis that
the screening effect adversely affects the profitability of a screening menu when the
low type is abundant.
Part (c) shows that, in contrast to the binary-type case, the reverse-screening menu
can no longer be optimal with continuously many types. Recall that we consider
reverse-screening menus whose quality/transfer schedule is non-increasing. Thus, the
class of menus that are dominated by pooling menu here includes any menu in which
the quality/transfer schedule is strictly decreasing over some local interval of types
while being constant elsewhere. To understand this result, recall that a key feature
of optimal reverse-screening with binary types was the participation effect: For the
low willingness-to-pay consumer, the participation constraint must be binding at the
optimum and therefore the additional loss arising from non-participation allows the
firm to extract a greater payment from this type by offering a higher quality product
[see (10)]. With a continuum of types, this effect no longer applies. The participation
constraint similarly binds for the lowest type, but the corresponding revenue impact is
only marginal. On the other hand, just as in the binary case, the incentive compatibility
requirement works against the profitability of reverse-screening menus.
13 This condition is easily satisfied if λ is not too large (if λ = 1, for instance, it holds irrespective of F).
For given λ, the requirement is met if θ ≥ F(θ)f (θ) for all θ , which, for example, holds for convex F .
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Remark 1 Our derivation of optimal menu is based on the restriction to monotone
menus. Therefore, Theorem 2 implies the following: When the conditions stipulated
in part (a) or (b) are met, the optimal TPE menu involves either pooling, or else,
strict violation of monotonicity (“local reverse-screening”). Neither contractual form
is predicted by the standard model with increasing virtual value.
4 Optimal TPPE menu
4.1 The seller’s problem
Let us next consider a consumer who is capable of choosing the best PE from a given
menu of bundles. We restrict attention to the binary consumer type case and TPPE
menus, i.e., TPEmenus that generate the highest ex ante utility to the consumer among
all corresponding PEs.
Given any TPE menu R = {bL , bH } ∈ M, let
C(R) := {R′ = {b′L , b′H } = R | b′i = ∅, bL , or bH for each i = L , H} ,
that is, the set of all menus other than R that can arise from each of the two types
choosing a bundle contained in R. In order for a TPE menu R = {bL , bH } to be a
TPPE, it must be that for every alternative consumption plan R′ ∈ C(R), either R′
fails to be a PE or the buyer’s ex ante payoff from R′ does not exceed that from R.
This requirement will be met if and only if R and R′ satisfy at least one of the five
inequalities below:
u(b′L |θL , R′) < u(b˜|θL , R′) for b˜ ∈ R\{b′L} (FICL)
u(b′L |θL , R′) < u(∅|θL , R′) (FIRL)
u(b′H |θH , R′) < u(b˜|θH , R′) for b˜ ∈ R\{b′H } (FICH )
u(b′H |θH , R′) < u(∅|θH , R′) (FIRH )
U (R′) ≤ U (R). (U )
Fixing a consumption plan R, the first four inequalities above represent violations
of the four (IC) and (IR) conditions, respectively, for an alternative plan R′ to constitute
itself a PE. These inequalities will be referred to as the (FIC) and (FIR) conditions.
The last inequality means that the buyer’s ex ante payoff from R′ does not exceed that
from R. We say that R ∈ M satisfies the PPE requirement with respect to R′ if at
least one of the above five inequalities is satisfied.
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A TPE menu R ∈ M is a TPPE if and only if it satisfies the PPE requirement with
respect to R′ for every R′ = C(R). Let Me denote the set of all such menus. Then,
the seller’s corresponding optimization program is given as follows14:
max
{(qL ,tL ),(qH ,tH )}∈Me
p(tL − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH − cqH ). [Pe]
4.2 Results
We begin our analysis of optimal TPPE menu by exploring a necessary condition for
a screening menu to be a TPPE. Suppose that the firm offers R = {bL , bH } such
that bL = bH intended to screen the high-type consumer. The problem is that the
consumer may instead form, or deviate to, an alternative consumption plan from the
offered bundles. In particular, choosing a constant bundle poses a potential benefit
in terms of gain–loss utilities. Our first result provides the conditions for a screening









1−(1−p)(λ−1) if p ≥ λ+2λ+3
and β(p, λ) :=
{
1−p(λ−1)
1+p(λ−1) if p ≤ 1λ+3
2




Lemma 3 Fix any screening menu R = {bL , bH }. Then, we obtain the following:
(a) R satisfies the PPE requirement with respect to RH := {bH } if and only if
tH − tL
vH − vL ≥ θLα(p, λ)(With the inequality being strict if p <
λ+2
λ+3 ); (23)
(b) R satisfies the PPE requirement with respect to RL := {bL} if and only if
tH − tL
vH − vL ≤ θHβ(p, λ)(With the inequality being strict if p >
1
λ+3 ). (24)
Furthermore, conditions (23) and (24) imply that R is a TPE.
Part (a) is derived from the following considerations. If bH was so expensive relative
to bL as to satisfy (23), the consumer would not deviate to RH (under which he would
always consume bH ) for one of two reasons: Either the low type prefers bL to bH so
that RH cannot be a PE, or the expected transfer from RH is sufficiently higher than
that from R such that RH overall yields a lower ex ante payoff than R. Part (b) and
14 The fact that the (FIC) and (FIR) conditions are strict inequalities implies that the set of TPPE menus
is not closed and hence not compact. This may cause nonexistence of the optimal menu. To avoid this
problem, we allow the (FIC) and (FIR) conditions to be satisfied as equality, in which case the optimum
can only be attained approximately.
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condition (24) are derived similarly by considering RL . These two conditions also
turn out to ensure that the screening menu R is itself a TPE, greatly facilitating our
characterization below.
It follows from (23) and (24) that a screening TPPE menu exists only if the RHS
of (24) is smaller than the RHS of (23), which delivers the necessary condition for
the existence of a screening TPPE menu. We next show that this condition is also
sufficient and holds if λ is not too large. A reverse-screening TPPE menu can exist
only if λ is sufficiently large. In contrast, one can always find a pooling TPPE menu
that yields a positive profit.
Proposition 5 Define λS ∈ (1,∞) such that θLα
(
p, λS




2θH − (1 + p)θL





We obtain the following:
(a) There exists a screening TPPE menu if and only if λ < λS. Also, there exist p and
p with 0 < p < p < 1 such that, as p increases, λS is (continuously) decreasing
for p < p, constant for p ∈ [p, p], and increasing for p > p.
(b) There exists a reverse-screening TPPE menu only if λ ≥ λR.
(c) There always exists a pooling TPPE menu that yields a positive profit.
An immediate implication from Proposition 5 is that only pooling menus can be
sustained as TPPE if the loss aversion parameter is in the range [λS, λR). Furthermore,
part (a) shows that screening is feasible under a smallest range on λ when p takes an
intermediate value: λS is minimized when p ∈ [p, p].
To gain some intuition, note first that the gain–loss utilities are generated by the
difference between the actual realized type and the expectation. Therefore, they occur
more often when the type distribution has a greater variance, which, in the case of
binary types, is true when p is closer to a half. In contrast to the PE analysis earlier, we
are now concerned with the consumer’s ex ante payoff comparisons across multiple
PEs: a greater variance in the type distribution makes the contingent consumption plan
less attractive ex ante.
It remains to show the shape of profit-maximizing TPPE menu. It turns out that a
screening menu is optimal whenever it can be supported as a TPPE. We state our next
theorem.
Theorem 3 The optimal menu that solves [Pe] is
(a) a pooling menu if λ ∈ [λS, λR);










= θHβ(p, λ). (26)
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Fig. 2 Optimal TPPE menu
Our proof of part (b) consists of two steps. First, we take a screeningmenu and solve
a relaxed problem by imposing the PPE requirement only for a subset of deviations,
RL , RH , and R∅H = {∅, H}. As shown in Lemma 3, the deviations to RL and RH
can be deterred by invoking (23) and (24). In order to deter the deviation to R∅H ,
the transfer for the low type, tL , should not be too large since otherwise the buyer
would find it better off ex ante to choose R∅H , i.e., (U ) is violated. This imposes
another upper bound on tL in addition to the bound imposed by (IRL) as part of the
TPE conditions. These two bounds can be written together as tL ≤ θLα(p, λ) (where
α(p, λ) is as defined in (22)). This constraint and (24) must be binding at the optimum
of the relaxed problem, which leads to the first-order conditions given in (25) and
(26). The second step of the proof then shows that the optimal menu for the relaxed
problem satisfies all other PPE requirements.
We have not derived a boundary beyond which reverse-screening begins to dom-
inate pooling, which can still be optimal when λ ≥ λR .15 Nonetheless, Theorem 3
demonstrates that the additional insurance motive captured by the PPE requirement
favors pooling for a wide range of parameter values. We offer a numerical illustration
in Fig. 2. To highlight the contrast with the TPE results earlier, we set θH
θL
= 1.5 as in
Example 1 and plot λS and λR together with λS and λR appearing in Fig. 1.
Remark 2 Notice the shaded region at the top left of Fig. 2 where optimal TPE menu
is pooling but screening is the optimal strategy under TPPE. The introduction of PPE
requirements reduces profitability of both types ofmenu. For instance, optimal pooling
15 See Section S.3 of the Supplementary Material for a numerical example of optimal reverse-screening
under TPPE.
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TPE menu may entail an alternative PE in which the buyer never makes a purchase.16
When the likelihood of low type is large, the PPE requirements make a greater impact
on pooling than on screening.
4.3 A role for redundant bundle
The analysis of PPE menus above followed the spirit of revelation principle, focusing
on the direct revelation menus. The restriction to direct menus is without loss if the
seller is allowed to select the truthful equilibrium, or TPE in out setup. However, the
notion of PPE also seeks optimality from the agent’s perspective and hence renders
the revelation principle inapplicable. In this section, we present a new possibility that
an indirect menu can improve the seller’s profit upon the optimal pooling TPPE menu
previously characterized. The alternative menu that we propose features two bundles,
but both consumer types pool on a single bundle, with the other remaining redundant.
Suppose that the optimal TPPE menu is a pooling menu M = {b∗ = (q∗, t∗)} for
which the PPE requirement against (the deviation to) the null menu R = {∅,∅} boils
down to condition (U ). This condition then imposes an upper bound on the transfer
as follows:
t∗ ≤ [pθL + (1 − p)θH − p(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θH − θL)]v(q∗) = Φv(q∗), (27)
where
Φ := pθL + (1 − p)θH − p(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θH − θL).
Let us now modify M and design a new menu M ′ = {b = (q, t), b′ = (q ′, t ′)},
where
– q = q∗ and t = Φv(q∗) + 	 for 	 > 0;
– q ′ = δ and t ′ = θH 2λ+1v(q ′) − δ′ for δ, δ′ > 0.
Since q = q∗ and t > t∗, the seller’s profit is higher under M ′ than under M , provided
that both types pooling on b constitutes a PPE.
This latter observation is indeed true under the following parametric restrictions.
Assumption 1 (i) λS < λ < 1 + 1p ;





















(iv) θH 2λ+1 < θL
1+p+(1−p)λ
1+(1−p)+pλ .
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, there are sufficiently small
values of 	, δ, and δ′ such that in the PPE of menu M ′ = {b, b′}, both types choose
b and the corresponding expected profit exceeds that from the optimal pooling TPPE
menu M = {b∗}.
16 It is straightforward to show that the optimal pooling or reverse-screening menu characterized in Theo-
rem 1 always involves ex ante loss.
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Fig. 3 PPE menu that yields a higher profit than the optimal TPPE menu
A formal proof is presented in Section S.4 of the Supplementary Material. To
understand this result, note first that, by Theorem 3 (since 1 + 1p ≤ λR), part (i) of
Assumption 1 implies that the optimal TPPEmenu is a poolingmenu; also, by part (ii),
(U ) is implied by (FICH ) and (FICL) and hence (U ) captures the PPE requirement
against R = {∅,∅}.
Next, consider our menu M ′. Here, pooling on b violates condition (U ) given in
(27) but still satisfies the PPE requirement against {∅,∅}. This is because the redundant
bundle b′ is constructed such that the high type would deviate from the null bundle
to choose b′. For providing such incentives to break pooling on ∅ as a PE, we need
to ensure that the screening effect of loss aversion works in favor of separation. An
important content of Assumption 1 therefore requires p to be sufficiently low (recall
from Sect. 3.1.3 that, for fixed λ, the effectiveness of screening is decreasing in p).
Introducing a redundant bundle however generates new constraints: First, the con-
sumer must be incentivized not to choose b′ over b, and second, the PPE requirements
must be satisfied against new potential PEs involving b′. In terms of the latter, since
three bundles (including the null bundle) are available, we need to check for 8 possi-
ble deviations from the desired pooling PE, while each deviation must be consistent
with (FICL), (FICH ) or (U ). Assumption 1-(iii) and -(iv) are invoked to handle these
requirements.
Assumption 1 is satisfied by a non-trivial set of parameter values. For instance, in
Fig. 3, we set θH/θL = 1.5 and depict those parameter values in the shaded region.
We do not know the full extent of optimal contracting under general indirect menus.
In the case of pooling menu, it is relatively easy to break undesired PEs by introducing
a redundant bundle since pooling menus admit a relatively small number of potential
deviations compared to screening or reverse-screening menus. To derive the profit-
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maximizing menu among all indirect menus with an arbitrary number of redundant
bundles, the optimization problem involves an intractable number of constraints. From
the perspective of mechanism design theory, the analysis of general optimal menu
amounts to searching for the second-best mechanism over the entire mechanism space,
direct or indirect, without help of the revelation principle. To our knowledge, this
question is yet to be tackled by the literature.
5 Alternative reference points
In this section, we discuss some alternative approaches, and their consequences, of
modeling gain–loss utilities in the price discrimination setup.
5.1 Bundles as stochastic reference point
Our approach to modeling a stochastic reference point is that each type-θ consumer
compares the utility from his consumption, i.e., θv(q), with the utility that each
hypothetical type θ ′ would have derived from consuming her reference bundle, i.e.,
θ ′v(qr (θ ′)). Thus, the gain–loss term on the intrinsic utility component for each type




θv(q) − θ ′v(qr (θ ′))) dF(θ ′), (28)
where μ is the loss aversion indicator function as defined in (2).
An alternative approach is to consider comparison of just the physical outcomes.






v(q) − v(qr (θ ′))) dF(θ ′), (29)
and (2) into
n(b; θ, θ ′, R(θ ′)) := n(b; θ, R(θ ′))
= θμ (v(q) − v(qr (θ ′))) + μ (tr (θ ′) − t) .
According to (29), each type-θ consumer evaluates his consumption bundle against
reference bundles with his own willingness to pay, ignoring a potential comparison
against other possible selves that he could have been.17 To further clarify the differ-
ence from (28), suppose that the reference bundle is identical for two distinct types,
i.e., R(θ ′) = R(θ ′′). In the alternative approach, the gain–loss utility is also treated
identically; in contrast, we consider the case in which the gain–loss utilities would
17 Orhun (2009) and Carbajal and Ely (2016) also assume that each type θ compares his consumption
bundle with (exogenously given) reference bundle in terms of his own θ . However, unlike (29), their gain–
loss formulation does not involve comparisons against other possible types. Similarly to us, gain–loss
formulation that compares utilities across types is adopted by Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and Herweg
and Mierendorff (2013), among others.
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differ across the two distinct types. Our approach recognizes the fact that the same
bundle could generate different consequences for different types.
Beyond the conceptual difference discussed above, the two approaches also gener-
ate different results. In particular, with (29), reverse-screening can never be incentive
feasible. The properties of screening and pooling menus remain identical nonetheless.
Next result characterizes the optimal TPEmenuwith the alternative utilitymodel in the
binary-type case. A corresponding analysis for the continuum-type case is presented
in Section S.5 of the Supplementary Material.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the buyer’s gain–loss utility is as given by (29). Also,
suppose that Θ = {θL , θH }. Then, the optimal menu that solves [P] is a pooling menu
if and only if λ ≥ λS, where λS is as defined in Proposition 3.
Proof Note first that the alternative gain–loss specification does not affect the (IR) con-
straints and hence the optimal pooling menu. Also, the (ICH ) constraint for screening
is given by
u(rH |θH , R) = θHv(qH ) − tH + p[θHv(qH ) − θHv(qL) − λ(tH − tL)]
≥ u(rL |θH , R) = θHv(qL) − tL + p(θH − θH )v(qL)
+ (1 − p)[(tH − tL) − λθH (v(qH ) − v(qL))],
which clearly leads to the same expression as (11). Therefore, Proposition 3 remains
true.
Next, we show that reverse-screening cannot be a PE. Consider a reverse-screening
menu with tL > tH and qL > qH . Then, (ICH ) is written as
θHv(qH ) − tH + p [−λθH (v(qL) − v(qH )) + (tL − tH )]
≥ θHv(qL) − tL + (1 − p) [θH (v(qL) − v(qH )) − λ(tL − tH )] ,
which simplifies to
(tL − tH ) [1 + p + (1 − p)λ] ≥ θH (vL − vH ) [1 + (1 − p) + pλ] . (30)
Analogously, (ICL) is written as
θLv(qL) − tL + (1 − p) [θL(v(qL) − v(qH )) − λ(tL − tH )]
≥ θLv(qH ) − tL + p [−λθL(v(qL) − v(qH )) + (tL − tH )] ,
which simplifies to
(tL − tH ) [1 + p + (1 − p)λ] ≤ θL(vL − vH ) [1 + (1 − p) + pλ] . (31)
Combining (30) and (31) yields
B(p, λ)θH ≤ tL − tH
v(qL) − v(qH ) ≤ B(p, λ)θL , (32)
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where B(p, λ) = 1+(1−p)+pλ1+p+(1−p)λ . It is clear that the two inequalities in (32) cannot hold
simultaneously. This completes the proof. unionsq
A key modeling choice that facilitates the KR approach in our setup is that the
buyer and seller have symmetric information when the seller designs/offers menu,
but the buyer later learns some additional payoff-relevant private information. As
observed in Sect. 3.1.2, this incomplete information is critical to our results. After
receiving new information, the buyer evaluates his consumption by not only its intrinsic
utility but also by comparing it with the utility or outcome previously anticipated
for every other possible contingency. In particular, the buyer’s ex post preference is
affected by the average gain–loss utility with respect to the (commonly known) prior
distribution.
Using the prior to evaluate gain–loss comparisons offers a convenient way of mod-
eling expectation-based reference-dependent utility. An interesting direction of future
research would however be to consider alternative approaches to incorporating gain–
loss comparisons across multiple types.18 Such a model would still be consistent with
KR’s rational expectations framework that attempts to endogenize reference point: The
buyer would form contingent consumption plan before learning his private informa-
tion, and this plan would have to be optimal for each realized type under the alternative
utility model.
5.2 Average bundle
An important motivation for adopting the KR model of reference-dependent prefer-
ences arose from recognizing the role of expectations. While in the KR model the
reference point is stochastic and equals the distribution of expected outcomes, the
models of disappointment aversion (Bell 1985; Loomes and Sugden 1986) formulate
the reference point as fixed, and in particular, as the expected utility certainty equiv-
alent of a gamble. A similar approach in our price discrimination setup would be to
take the expected utility of the contingent bundles as reference point.19
Formally, with binary types and menu {bL , bH }, consider type-θ buyer’s gain–loss
utility from bundle b = (q, t) to be
μ [θv(q) − (pθLv(qL) + (1 − p)θHv(qH ))] + μ [(ptL + (1 − p)tH ) − t] . (33)
In Section S.5 of the Supplementary Material, we solve for the optimal menu under
this alternative specification of reference-dependent preferences. It turns out that this
analysis is very close to that of optimal TPE menus in Sect. 3. Whenever a pooling
menu maximizes the firm’s profit under TPE, it does so here as well.
18 For instance, one could conceive of a decision maker who considers only the maximum gain and loss
(instead of the average).
19 De Meza and Webb (2007) apply the disappointment aversion model to an incentive provision setup.
123
J.-H. Hahn et al.
5.3 Additive separability
Our formulation of gain–loss utilities treats quality and money dimensions in an addi-
tive separable form. This is consistent with the endowment effect observed in many
empirical studies. An alternative formulation would be to apply the gain–loss utility
to the total utility, θv(q) − t . It turns out that the predictions of our model under such
a gain–loss specification are no different from the model with standard preferences.
See Section S.5 of the Supplementary Material.
6 Conclusion
We often find sellers offering menus with just a small number of bundles. This paper
demonstrates that such observations are consistent with profit-maximizing firms that
face loss averse consumers.We show that, in the binary-type case, a poolingmenu is the
seller’s optimal menu under a range of loss aversion parameter if the low willingness-
to-pay consumers are sufficiently abundant. This result arises as a consequence of
the interplay between loss aversion and asymmetric information. The benefits from
screening with multiple bundles become even more restricted when the consumer
is capable of choosing the personal equilibrium that generates the highest ex ante
payoff. We also identify conditions under which partial or even full pooling dominates
screening for the seller facing a continuum of consumer types.
The optimal menus described in our analysis above have the feature that the buyer’s
ex ante expected utility (including anticipated gain–loss) often falls below zero. This
can be problematic for the seller if the consumer can calculate the ex ante loss and
find some commitment device to stay away from the menu altogether. In our previous
working paper Hahn et al. (2012), we showed that introducing an additional ex ante
participation constraint to the analysis (requiring the buyer’s ex ante expected utility to
be nonnegative) does not alter our central message. In fact, the loss averse consumer’s
ex ante insurance motives can induce the profit-maximizing firm to offer pooling
menus under a wider range of parameters.
The same conclusion also holds in an alternativemodel of ex ante contractingwhere
the buyer’s participation decision is made before his type is realized. That is, the buyer,
when deciding whether to accept the menu offered by the seller, is uncertain about
his willingness to pay. Analyzing the optimal PPE menu in this alternative model
reveals that the pooling menu is optimal for a larger set of parameters under the ex
ante participation constraint than under the ex post one. Again, the buyer’s insurance
motives reinforce the benefits of pooling.20 These additional results, together with
those reported in Sect. 5 for additively separable gain–loss utilities, demonstrate that
the optimality of pooling is a general phenomenon with loss averse consumers, valid
under different decision-making scenarios and time lines.
Our theory offers potential explanations forwhy some sellers fail to fullymaterialize
the benefits from further price discrimination in industries that seem to have low fixed
20 This ex ante participationmodel is fully analyzed in a separatework,which can be provided upon request.
Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) study an alternative ex ante participation model of price discrimination.
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costs of adding another product variant. For example, seats in existing entertainment
venues provide different views and the cost of offering multiple seating categories is
essentially zero. But, the practice of price discrimination in this industry, sometimes
known as “scaling the house,” displays wide variations both within and across markets
as well as across time (see the survey of Courty 2000). In particular, many ticket sellers
indeed choose to offer uniform pricing or very few seating categories.21 In a study of
another industry with potentially low fixed product costs, Crawford and Shum (2007)
report that 70% of over 1000 US cable TV providers in their sample year of 1995
offered a single package of channels only and estimate substantial unrealized returns
from price discrimination.22
Consistent with our prediction that price discrimination would bemore likely under
certainmarket conditions, in contrast to pop concerts, high-brow entertainment events,
such as classical concerts, usually offer many seating categories (e.g., Huntington
1993); in their cross-sectional study of cable TVproviders, Crawford and Shum (2007)
report evidence that markets offering more cable packages tend to be “populated by
households with greater tastes for cable service quality (Crawford and Shum 2007, p.
201).” Our results can also shed light on observed pricing practices in other industries.
For example, buses and motels usually offer a single type of seats and rooms, and this
contrasts with the standard features of trains and hotels that frequently serve upscale
travelers.
While we take the uncertainty to affect willingness to pay directly, variations in
willingness to pay may arise from other sources, for example, income shocks. In
such a case, however, the buyer should also realize gain–loss utility in that uncertain
monetary dimension. Also, ourmodel suggests that, contrary to common observations,
reverse-screening can be optimal if the consumer is significantly loss averse (at least
with only few consumer types). Interestingly, Ayres (1995) and Ayres and Siegelman
(1995) found a case of car dealers who offered substantially lower prices to white
consumers than to nonwhite consumers. Given the high willingness to pay estimated
for white buyers, these authors suggested racial bias behind the observed practice.
In a recent paper, however, Bang et al. (2014) provide a rational justification of such
“reverse price discrimination.” Although these accounts are concerned with third-
degree price discrimination, they suggest that reverse-screening may not be a mere
theoretical possibility.
21 Leslie (2004) investigates the revenue impact of price discrimination at a single Broadway play and
observes that almost 75% of the performances offered just two seating categories with the remainder
offering three. In a large panel dataset on US pop music concerts analyzed by Courty and Pagliero (2012),
Courty and Pagliero (2012), two categories were used by more than half of the sample and another quarter
came with single price ticketing. Uniformly priced seats are usually allocated on the first-come-first-served
basis, and hence, the customers can be thought of as facing a single, random seat quality.
22 The analysis ofCrawford andShum (2007)was based on data from1995.While theUS cable TV industry
continues to be local monopolies to this date, the overall market landscape has changed substantially. First,
cable TV providers now face significant competition from digital satellite providers. Second, the products
offered by cabel TV providers have widened horizontally in the advent of new technologies such as Internet,
recording and on-demand services. Nonetheless, the average number of purely vertically differentiated cable
TV packages currently on offer are still very few.
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Appendix 1: Omitted proofs from Sect. 3
In the proofs throughout the Appendix, we simplify notation by letting vL := v(qL)
and vH := v(qH ), and refer to their derivatives as v′L and v′H , respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1 The proof consists of two claims.
Claim If the optimal menu satisfies θHvH ≥ θLvL , then it must be that tH ≥ tL .
Proof Suppose to the contrary that tL > tH . Clearly, we must have both (IR) con-
straints binding or
u(∅|θH , R) = u(rL |θL , R) = θLvL − tL − (1 − p)λ[θHvH − θLvL + tL − tH ]
(34)
u(∅|θL , R) = u(rH |θH , R) = θHvH − tH + p[θHvH − θLvL + tL − tH ]. (35)
Since u(∅|θH , R) = u(∅|θL , R), equating (34) and (35) yields
[1 + p + (1 − p)λ](tL − tH ) = [1 + p + (1 − p)λ](θLvL − θHvH ),
which is a contradiction since tL − tH > 0 but θLvL − θHvH ≤ 0.
Claim It is never optimal to offer a menu with θLv(qL) > θHv(qH ).
Proof Suppose that θLv(qL) > θHv(qH ). A similar argument to that in the proof of
Claim 1 can be used to show tL ≥ tH . Then, rewrite (IR) constraints as
tH ≤ θH λ + 1
2
vH and tL ≤ tH + θLvL − θHvH
B(p, λ)
.
Since both constraints must clearly be binding, we can substitute these into the








= [(λ + 1)B(p, λ) − 2p] θH
2(1 − p)B(p, λ) .
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= (λ + 1)B(p, λ)θH − 2 [pθH + (1 − p)θL ]
2(1 − p)B(p, λ)
≥ [(λ + 1)B(p, λ) − 2] θH
2(1 − p)B(p, λ) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds since (λ + 1)B(p, λ) ≥ (λ + 1)B(0, λ) = 2,∀λ, p.
Proof of Proposition 3 Considermaximizing profit under the (IC) and (IR) constraints
and under the quality constraint, qH − qL ≥ 0. We show the following: When the
quality constraint is not binding, the optimal qualities must be given by (13) and (14),
and the quality constraint is binding if (15) holds.
First, one can easily check that (IRH ) is implied by (IRL) and (ICH ) since
u(rH |θH , R) ≥ u(rL |θH , R) ≥ u(rL |θL , R) ≥ u(∅|θL , R) = u(∅|θH , R), (36)
where the second inequality holds since if two types choose the same bundle, rL ,
then θH is better off in terms of both intrinsic and gain–loss utilities. Next, after
rearrangement, we can write (IRL) and (IC) constraints, respectively, as









where B(p, λ) = 1+(1−p)+pλ1+p+(1−p)λ as defined in (5).23 By the usual argument, (IRL) and
(ICH ) must be binding.
Using the two binding constraints, we obtain (10) and (12) for tL and tH , respec-
tively. Substituting these into the objective function, the seller’s problem becomes
max{qL ,qH }
p(tL − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH − cqH )
= λ + 1
2
θLvL + (1 − p)θH (vH − vL)
B(p, λ)
− pcqL − (1 − p)cqH ,
subject to qH ≥ qL . Ignoring the quality constraint for the moment, the FOCs with
respect to qL and qH yield (13) and (14). One can then check that the RHS of (14) is
no larger than that of (13) if and only if the inequality (15) holds, which means that
the quality constraint is binding in such a case.
Toobtain the comparative statics forqL ,qH , andλS , let us first observe the following
facts: (i) B(p, λ) increases with λ > 1 if and only if p > 12 ; (ii) B(p, λ) increases
with p if λ > 1; and (iii) (λ + 1)B(p, λ) increases from 1 to infinity as λ increases
starting from λ = 1. The comparative statics for qH directly follows from (i) and the
23 The full expression of these constraints is given in Section S.1 of the Supplementary Material.
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fact that c
v′(·) is increasing. As for the comparative statics regarding qL , rewrite the
maximand in (13) as
θL − [2(1 − p)θH ] / [(λ + 1)B(p, λ)]
2p/(λ + 1) ,
whose numerator increases in λ by (iii), while its denominator decreases. So the
optimal qL , if not 0, must increase. The existence and properties of λS follow from
(ii) and (iii). unionsq
Before proving Lemma 2 and Proposition 4, we write here the (IC) and (IR) con-
straints for the reverse-screening menu, whose forms differ depending on whether
θLvL ≥ θHvH or θLvL ≤ θHvH .24
In case θLvL ≥ θHvH , the constraints (ICH ), (ICL), (IRH ), and (IRL) are, respec-
tively, given as
tL − tH ≥ [1 + (1 − p) + pλ]θH (vL − vH ) − p(λ − 1)(θH − θL)vL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ (39)
[1 + (1 − p) + pλ]θL(vL − vH ) + (1 − p)(λ − 1)(θH − θL)vH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ ≥ tL − tH (40)
θH (λ + 1)vH ≥ 2tH (41)
[1 + (1 − p) + pλ]θLvL + (1 − p)(λ − 1)θHvH
≥ [1 + p + (1 − p)λ]tL − (1 − p)(λ − 1)tH (42)
while in case θLvL ≤ θHvH , they are given as
[1 + p + (1 − p)λ](tL − tH ) ≥ 2θH (vL − vH ) (43)
(λ + 1)θL(vL − vH ) ≥ [1 + p + (1 − p)λ](tL − tH ) (44)
[1 + p + (1 − p)λ]θHvH + p(λ − 1)θLvL ≥ 2tH (45)
(λ + 1)θLvL ≥ [1 + p + (1 − p)λ]tL − (1 − p)(λ − 1)tH . (46)
Proof of Lemma 2 To prove (a), let us consider both cases of reverse-screening menu.
In case θLvL ≤ θHvH , the LHS of (44) being greater than the RHS of (43) yields (16)
after rearrangement. In case θLvL ≥ θHvH , combining (40) and (39) yields
(λ + 1)vH − 2vL ≥ 0, (47)
which implies λ+12 ≥ vLvH ≥ θHθL .
To prove (b), consider maximizing profit under the constraints (39) to (42) and the
constraint that θLvL − θHvH ≥ 0. It suffices to show that the last constraint must be
binding. First, the same inequalities as in (36) can be used to show that (41) is implied
by (39) and (42). Next, to identify the binding constraints, we depict as a shaded area
24 For the full expressions, see Section S.1 of the Supplementary Material.
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tH
ICH binding: slope=1






where ptL + (1 − p)tH =constant
Fig. 4 Set of feasible (tL , tH ) for reverse-screening menu with qL and qH given
in Fig. 4 below the set of (tL , tH )’s satisfying (39), (40), and (42) for any given qL
and qH . Clearly, (ICH ) and (IRL), i.e., (39) and (42), must be binding.25
Combining the two binding constraints, we obtain
tH (qL , qH ) = (λ + 1)θHvH
2
− 2(θH − θL)vL (48)
tL(qL , qH ) = [1 + (1 − p) + pλ]θH (vL − vH ) − p(λ − 1)(θH − θL)vL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
+ tH (qL , qH ). (49)
Note that given (39) is binding, (40) is satisfied if and only if (47) is satisfied so we
can replace (40) by (47). Now, using (47) and θLvL − θHvH ≥ 0 as constraints, the
Lagrangian for the maximization problem can be written as
L(qL , qH , μ, η) = p(tL(qL , qH ) − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH (qL , qH ) − cqH )
+ μ [(λ + 1)vH − 2vL ] + η(θLvL − θHvH ). (50)
where μ and η are nonnegative multipliers. Suppose that θLvL − θHvH ≥ 0 is not
binding so η = 0. Substituting (48) and (49) into (50), the FOCs are given by
25 A formal proof is a straightforward translation of graphical illustration and is thus omitted.
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= [1 + p − p
2 + (1 − p + p2)λ]θL − (1 − p)(λ + 1)θH
p[1 + p + (1 − p)λ] =: ΨL (51)
c
v′H
− μ(λ + 1)
1 − p =
[1 − 2p + 2(1 + p)λ + λ2]θH
2[1 + p + (1 − p)λ] =: ΨH . (52)
One can verify that ΨH > ΨL . Given this, and μ ≥ 0, (51) and (52) require
qH > qL , which is a contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 By Lemma 2, we focus on the case θHvH − θLvL ≥ 0. Con-
sider maximizing profit under the constraints (43) to (46), and θHvH − θLvL ≥ 0,
also subject to qL ≥ qH . We show that qL = qH if (17) holds.
Fist, we can ignore (45) since it is implied by (43) and (46) for the same reason as
in (36). To identify the binding constraints, with qL and qH fixed, we depict the set
of (tL , tH ) satisfying the constraints, (43), (44), and (46), to obtain the same graph as
Fig. 4. From this, it is immediate that (46) and (43) are binding, which gives us
tH (qL , qH ) = (λ + 1)θLvL
2
− θH (vL − vH )
tL(qL , qH ) = (λ + 1)θLvL
2
− θH (1 − p)(λ − 1)
1 + p + (1 − p)λ(vL − vH ).
Ignoring the constraint qL ≥ qH for the moment, we set up the Lagrangian
L(qL , qH , μ, η) = p(tL(qL , qH ) − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH (qL , qH ) − cqH )




+ 2μ + ηθL
p
= [1 + p + (1 − p)λ](λ + 1)θL − 2(1 − p)(λ + 1)θH




− μ(λ + 1) + ηθH
1 − p =
(λ + 1)θH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ =: Ψ˜H . (54)
One can check that Ψ˜H ≥ Ψ˜L if (17) holds, which implies that given μ, η ≥ 0,
(53) and (54) can only be satisfied when qH ≥ qL . Thus, qL = qH if (17) holds.






− (1 + p)
)
=: λR .




the proof of Proposition 4. unionsq
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Appendix 2: Omitted proofs from Sect. 4
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3) Part (a) Consider any screening menu R and a deviation
R′ = RH , for which (FICL), (FIRL), (FICH ), (FIRH ), and (U ) can be written as
tH − tL









vH − vL > θH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
2
















vH − vL ≥ θL
1 + (1 − p)(λ − 1)
1 − (1 − p)(λ − 1) > 0. (59)
Note first that (57) contradicts (ICH ) in (38) since the RHS of (57) is greater than
θH
B(p,λ) . It is straightforward to check that the RHS of (58) is greater than the RHS of
(56), so (58) implies (56). Also, subtracting the (IRL) constraint, tL ≤ θL λ+12 vL , from
(56) and rearranging yields (55). Thus, the PPE requirement with respect to RH boils
down to satisfying either (55) or (59), which gives us the condition in (23).
Part (b) Let us next consider a deviation R′ = RL , for which (FICL), (FIRL),




λ + 1 −















vH − vL < θH
2











vH − vL ≤ θH
1 − p(λ − 1)
1 + p(λ − 1) . (64)
Note first that (60) contradicts (ICL) in (38) since the RHS of (60) is smaller than
θL
B(p,λ) . It is straightforward to check that (61) and (63) contradict (IRL) in (37), so
they can be ignored. Thus, the PPE requirement with respect to RL boils down to
satisfying either (62) or (64), which gives us the condition in (24).
The statement that (ICL) are (ICH ) are implied by (23) and (24) can be established
if we show that for any p ∈ (0, 1) and λ > 1,
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α(p, λ) ≥ 1
B(p, λ)
≥ β(p, λ). (65)
To do so, observe first that λ+12 >
1
B(p,λ) = 1+p+(1−p)λ1+(1−p)+pλ > 2λ+1 . Given this, (65)
will be shown if (i) 1+(1−p)(λ−1)1−(1−p)(λ−1) ≥ 1+p+(1−p)λ1+(1−p)+pλ when p ≥ λ+2λ+3 and (ii) 1−p(λ−1)1+p(λ−1) ≤
1+p+(1−p)λ
1+(1−p)+pλ when p ≤ 1λ+3 . To prove this, observe that if p ≥ λ+2λ+3 , then
1 + (1 − p)(λ − 1)
1 − (1 − p)(λ − 1) −
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
1 + (1 − p) + pλ
= (λ − 1)(λ + 2 − p(λ + 1))
(1 − (1 − p)(λ − 1))(1 + (1 − p) + pλ) > 0,
and also that
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
1 + (1 − p) + pλ −
1 − p(λ − 1)
1 + p(λ − 1) =
(λ − 1)(1 + p + pλ)
(1 + (1 − p) + pλ)(1 + p(λ − 1)) > 0,
as desired. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5
Part (a) We prove the if part in the proof of Theorem 3 by constructing a screening
PPE menu that is optimal among all PPE menus under the given condition. Here we
only prove the only if part. To do so, note that we can combine (23) and (24) in
Lemma 3 to write the following necessary condition for any screening menu R to be
a PPE:
θLα(p, λ) ≤ tH − tL
vH − vL ≤ θHβ(p, λ) (66)
with the first inequality being strict if p < λ+2
λ+3 and the second inequality being strict
if p > 1





β(p,λ) =: γ (p, λ). The following claim establishes several properties of
γ .
Claim γ is a continuous function that satisfies the following properties:
(i) γ (p, ·) is strictly increasing;
(ii) γ (p, 1) = 1 and limλ→∞ γ (p, λ) = ∞; and
(iii) γ (·, λ) is strictly increasing if p < 1
λ+3 , constant if p ∈ [ 1λ+2 , λ+2λ+3 ], and strictly
decreasing if p > λ+2
λ+3 .
Proof Clearly, γ is continuous. It is also clear that α(p, ·) is strictly increasing and
β(p, ·) is strictly decreasing; thus, γ (p, ·) is strictly increasing, proving (i). To prove
(ii), note that α(p, 1) = β(p, 1) = 1 so γ (p, 1) = 1. Also, for sufficiently large λ,
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(iii) follows from combining that γ (p, λ) = α(p,λ)
β(p,λ) and the fact that α(·, λ) is strictly
decreasing if p > λ+2
λ+3 and constant otherwise while β(·, λ) is strictly decreasing if
p < 1
λ+3 and constant otherwise. unionsq
Properties (i) and (ii) along with the continuity of γ imply that there exists λS > 1
such that θH
θL
> γ (p, λ) if and only if λ < λS .
Next observe that by (iii), we have maxp∈[0,1] γ (p, λ) = (λ+1)24 = γ (p, λ) for any
p ∈ [ 1
λ+3 ,
λ+2




− 1, we solve (λ+1)24 = θHθL to obtain λ = λ.
Thus, letting p = 1
λ+3 and p = λ+2λ+3 , we have λS = λ for p ∈ [p, p]. The fact that
γ (·, λ) is increasing in p if p ∈ (0, 1
λ+3 ) and γ is increasing in λ, means that λS is
decreasing in p and greater than λ for p ∈ (0, 1
λ+3 ). Similarly, λS is decreasing in
p and greater than λ in the range ( λ+2
λ+3 , 1). Also, the monotonicity of λS implies that
λS is maximized at p = 0 or 1. Since γ (0, λ) = γ (1, λ) = λ+12 , solving λ+12 = θHθL
yields λ = 2θH
θL
− 1. Thus, if we let λ = 2θH
θL
− 1, then λS < λ for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Part (b) Consider any reverse-screening menu satisfying θHvH ≥ θLvL . (We will
later discuss reverse-screening menu with θHvH < θLvL .) To facilitate the reference,
we rewrite here (ICH ) and (ICL) constraints in (43) and (44) as
2θH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ ≤︸︷︷︸
(ICH )
tL − tH
vL − vH ≤︸︷︷︸
(ICL )
(λ + 1)θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ . (67)
Let us first consider a deviation R′ = RL = {bL}. The conditions (FICL), (FIRL),
(FICH ), (FIRH ), and (U ) are given as
tL − tH











vL − vH > θH












≥ θH if p(λ − 1) < 1
≤ θH if p(λ − 1) > 1, (72)
respectively. In addition, (U ) always holds if p(λ − 1) = 1. Note first that (68)
contradicts (ICL) in (67). We can also ignore (71) because it implies (69). However,
(69) contradicts (IRL) in (46) since (1+p+(1−p)λ)tL−(1−p)(λ−1)tH > 2tL . Thus,
the reverse-screening menu R must satisfy either (70) or (72). Since 1+p+(1−p)λ2 > 1,
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(70) implies (72) in case p(λ−1) < 1,whichmeans that (72)must hold if p(λ−1) < 1.
If p(λ − 1) > 1, then either (70) or (72) must hold.
Consider next a deviation R′ = RH = {bH }. Then, the conditions (FICL), (FIRL),
(FICH ), (FIRH ), and (U ) are given as
tL − tH
vL − vH < θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ








vL − vH < θH
2






[θH (1 + p + (1 − p)λ) + p(λ − 1)θL ] (76)
tL − tH
vL − vH ≤ θL , (77)
respectively. First, each of (73) and (75) implies (77) since the right-hand sides of the
former inequalities are both smaller than the RHS of the latter. So, (73) and (75) can
be ignored. Similarly, (76) implies (74) and can thus be ignored. In sum, either (74)
or (77) must hold for the buyer not to deviate to RH .
Claim If either p(λ − 1) < 1 or p(λ − 1) ≥ 1 and p ≥ θL2θH −θL , then (74) cannot be
satisfied by any reverse-screening PPE menu.
Proof Suppose that under the assumed conditions, there is a reverse-screening PPE





1 + p + (1 − p)λ . (78)
To see it, rewrite (43) and (74) as
tL − tH ≥
(
2θH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
)







Sum up the two inequalities side by side to obtain
tL >
2θH











1 + p + (1 − p)λvL ,
where the second inequality holds since θL λ+12 ≥ θH > 2θH1+p+(1−p)λ .
Let us consider the PPE requirement with respect to R∅ := {∅}, which requires
to satisfy at least one of the conditions, (FICL), (FIRL), (FICH ), (FIRH ), and (U ),
written as follows:
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λ + 1 (82)
U (R) ≥ U (R∅) = 0 (83)






λ+1 < θH ≤ θL λ+12 , (81) contradicts (78) while (82)
contradicts (74). Therefore, (83) must hold. We prove below that (83) cannot hold if
either (i) p(λ − 1) ≤ 1 or (ii) p(λ − 1) > 1 and p ≥ θL2θH −θL .
Case (i) In this case, the first inequality of (72) must hold (since it is implied by (70) as
mentioned above). Define R′ = {(qL , t ′L), (qH , t ′H )} to be a reverse-screening menu
with the same quantities as R, where t ′H = θL λ+12 vH and t ′L = t ′H + θH (vL − vH ) =
θL
λ+1
2 vH +θH (vL −vH ). Note that due to (74) and the first inequality of (72), we have
t ′H < tH , t ′L < tL , and t ′L − t ′H ≤ tL − tH . Clearly, this implies that U (R′) > U (R).
We now obtain
U (R′) = vH [θH − θL 1+λ2 ] + vL p(θH − θL)[p(λ − 1) − λ].
Since θH ≤ λ+12 θL and p(λ − 1) < 1, the expressions in both square brackets are
negative, so U (R) < U (R′) < 0, which contradicts (83).
Case (ii) Define R′′ = {(qL , t ′′L), (qH , t ′′H )} to be a reverse-screening menu with the
same qualities as R, where t ′′H = θL λ+12 vH and t ′′L = t ′′H + 2θH1+p+(1−p)λ (vL − vH ) =
θL
λ+1
2 vH + 2θH1+p+(1−p)λ (vL −vH ). It can be verified that due to (43) and (74), we have
t ′′H < tH , t ′′L < tL , and t ′′L − t ′′H ≤ tL − tH . Clearly, this implies that U (R′′) > U (R).
We now show that U (R′′) < 0 so (83) cannot be satisfied. First, it can be shown that
U (R′′) is decreasing as λ increases.26 It thus suffices to show that U (R′′) < 0 for the
lowest λ, which is equal to 1 + 1p given the assumption that p(λ − 1) ≥ 1. Setting





− p (1 − p) (θH vH − θLvL ) − 2p(1 − p)θH (vL − vH )
(1 + p + λ − pλ)2 < 0.





− p (1 − p) (θLvL − θH vH ) − 2(1 − p)pθH (vH − vL )
(1 + p + λ − pλ)2 < 0.
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λ = 1 + 1p , we obtain after rearrangement
U (R′′) = −θLvL + 2p
2(2θH − θL)(vH − vL) + pθL(−3vH + 2vL)
2p(1 + p) . (84)
Let h(p) denote the numerator of this expression as a function of p. To show that
h(p) < 0 for any p ≥ θL2θH −θL , observe that h is a quadratic function maximized at





< θL2θH −θL , where the inequality holds since
2vL−3vH
4vL−4vH < 1.
Thus, for any p ≥ θL2θH −θL , h(p) ≤ h( θL2θH −θL ) = 2θLθH vH−2θH +θL < 0. unionsq
When p(λ − 1) < 1, the above argument and Claim 1 imply that (77) must hold.
But (72) and (77) contradict each other, which means there does not exist a reverse-
screening PPE menu if p(λ − 1) < 1. Thus, the existence of reverse-screening PPE
menu requires p(λ − 1) ≥ 1 or λ ≥ 1 + 1p . Define:
λR := max
{
2θH − (1 + p)θL






1 + 1p if p < θL2θH −θL
2θH −(1+p)θL
(1−p)θL if p ≥ θL2θH −θL .
Given this, if p < θL2θH −θL , then λ ≥ λR is necessary for the existence of reverse-
screening PPE menu. Consider now the case where p(λ− 1) ≥ 1 and p ≥ θL2θH −θL . In
this case, according to Claim 1, we must satisfy (77), which contradicts with (ICH )
in (67) if θL <
2θH
1+p+(1−p)λ . Thus, it is necessary to have θL ≥ 2θH1+p+(1−p)λ or
λ ≥ 2θH −(1+p)θL
(1−p)θL = λR for p ≥ θL2θH −θL . In sum, λ ≥ λR is necessary for the
existence of reverse-screening PPE menu. It is straightforward to verify that λS <
λ = 2θH
θL
− 1 < 2θH
θL
≤ λR .
Recall that we have so far focused on a reverse-screening menu satisfying θHvH ≥
θLvL . The necessity proof is then completed by the result in the following lemma that
the necessary condition does not get relaxed by considering a reverse-screening menu
with θHvH < θLvL .
Lemma 4 There exists a reverse-screening PPE menu with θHvH < θLvL only if
λ ≥ λR.
Proof Fix any reverse-screening menu R with θLvL > θHvH . We prove that (i) the
inequalities (39) and (40) corresponding to (ICH ) and (ICL) imply their counterparts
in (67) for a reverse-screeningmenu satisfying θHvH ≥ θLvL ; (ii) for eachmenu R′ =
RH , RL , or R∅, the inequalities corresponding to (FIC), (FIR), and (U ) conditions
imply their counterparts for reverse-screeningmenuwith θHvH ≥ θLvL . Given (i) and
(ii), the proof of Part (b) in Proposition 5 can be repeated to show that λ ≥ λR is also
necessary for the existence of reverse-screening PPE menu satisfying θHvH < θLvL .
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To show (i), consider any reverse-screening menu satisfying θLvL > θHvH and
write (39) and (40) as
2θH
1 + p + (1 − p)λ +
p(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH )
(1 + p + (1 − p)λ)(vL − vH )
≤ tL − tH
vL − vH ≤
(λ + 1)θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ −
(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH )
(1 + p + (1 − p)λ)(vL − vH ) ,
which clearly implies (67), given that θLvL > θHvH .
To show (ii), consider first the reference point RL = {bL}. It is straightforward to
see that the conditions (FICL), (FIRL), and (FIRH ) are the same ss (FICL), (FIRL),
and (FIRH ) in (68), (69), and (71), respectively. The condition (FICH ) is given as
tL − tH
vL − vH >
[1 + p + λ(1 − p)] θH
2
+ p(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH )
2(vL − vH ) ,
which implies (FICH ) in (70). Condition (U ) is given as
[1 − p(λ − 1)] (tL − tH ) ≥ [1 − p(λ − 1)] θH (vL − vH )
+ 2p(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH ), (85)
while (U ) in (72) can be rewritten as
[1 − p(λ − 1)] (tL − tH ) ≥ [1 − p(λ − 1)] θH (vL − vH ). (86)
It is clear that neither condition holds when 1− p(λ−1) < 0 while (86) always holds
when 1 − p(λ − 1) = 1. Subtracting the RHS of (86) from the RHS of (85) yields
2p(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH ) > 0.
Thus, (85) implies (86) when 1 − p(λ − 1) > 0.
Next let us consider RH = {bH }. It is straightforward to see that (FIRL), (FICH ),
and (FIRH ) are the same as (FIRL), (FICH ), and (FIRH ) in (74), (75), and (76),
respectively. (FICL) is given as
tL − tH
vL − vH < θL
1 + p + λ(1 − p)
1 + λ −
(λ − 1)(1 − p) (θLvL − θHvH )
(1 + λ)(vL − vH ) ,
which implies (FICL) in (73), given that θLvL − θHvH > 0. Condition (U ) is given
as
tL − tH
vL − vH ≤ θL −
2(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH )
(1 + (1 − p)(λ − 1))(vL − vH ) ,
which implies (U ) in (77).
123
J.-H. Hahn et al.
Consider R′ = R∅. (FIC) and (FIR) are the same as their counterparts in the case
θHvH ≥ θLvL , which are given in (79) through (82). (U ) is written as
p(θLvL − tL) + (1 − p)(θHvH − tH ) − p(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θLvL − θHvH
+tH − tL) ≥ 0
while its counterpart in the case θHvH ≥ θLvL is
p(θLvL − tL) + (1 − p)(θHvH − tH ) − p(1 − p)(λ − 1)(θHvH − θLvL
+ tH − tL) ≥ 0.
The latter inequality is implied by the former, given that θHvH − θLvL < 0. unionsq
Part (c) Given R = {b = (q, t)} with q, t > 0, the (I RL) constraint is t ≤
θL
λ+1
2 v(q). Note that this is the only constraint needed for R to be a PE. Given R, there
are three possible deviations: R′ = {∅,∅}, {∅, b}, and {b,∅}. First, it is straightforward
to verify that R always satisfies the PPE requirement with respect to R′ = {b,∅}.27




1 + λv(q) and tL < θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ
1 + (1 − p) + pλv(q).
Thus, for any q > 0, if we set t = θLk′v(q) for some positive constant k′ <
min{ 21+λ , 1+p+(1−p)λ1+(1−p)+pλ }, then R = {(q, t)} is a pooling PPE menu. The profit from
this menu is θLk′v(q) − cq, which is positive for a sufficiently small q, due to the
assumption that limq→0 v′(q) = ∞.
Proof of Theorem 3
We only need to prove part (b). The proof consists of two lemmas. In the first lemma,
we consider a relaxed problem by weakening the PPE requirement as follows:
max
R={bL ,bH }
p(tL − cqL) + (1 − p)(tH − cqH ) [P ′]
subject to the constraints that R is a PE menu and also satisfies the PPE requirement
with respect to RL = {bL}, RH = {bH }, and R∅H := {∅, bH }.
Lemma 5 If λ < λS, then the optimal menu that solves [P ′] must be a screening
menu.
27 More precisely, it is true that R′ = {b,∅} must satisfy at least one of (FICH ) and (FICL ) conditions,
that is, u(∅|θH , R′) < u(b|θH , R′) and u(b|θL , R′) < u(∅|θH , R′).
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Proof Recall fromLemma 3 that the necessary and sufficient condition for any screen-
ing menu R to satisfy the PPE requirement with respect to RL and RH is given by
(66). Then, by Lemma 3, the (IC) constraints in (38) are implied by (66) and can thus
be ignored.
Let us now turn to the PPE requirement with respect to R∅H , for which the condi-




1 + p + (1 − p)λ





















[1 − (1 − p)(λ − 1)] tL ≤ [1 + (1 − p)(λ − 1)] θLvL . (91)
First, (89) contradicts (ICH ) in (38). Second, (87) implies (91) and can thus be
ignored. To see this, we can focus on the case [1− (1− p)(λ−1)] > 0, so (91) can be
rewritten as tL
vL
≤ θL 1+(1−p)(λ−1)1−(1−p)(λ−1) , which is then implied by (87) since 1+(1−p)(λ−1)1−(1−p)(λ−1) >
1
B(p,λ) (as shown in the proof of Lemma 3). Next, (90) cannot hold. To see it, sum up
(90) and (IRL) constraint, rewritten as −tL ≥ −θL λ+12 vL , side by side to obtain
tH − tL > θH 1
B(p, λ)
vH − θL λ + 1
2
vL .
This inequality contradicts the second inequality of (66) since the RHS of the former
is greater than that of the latter:
θH
B(p, λ)
vH − θL λ + 1
2





































where the first inequality holds since 1B(p,λ) ≥ β(p, λ) (by Lemma 3) and vH > vL .
To see why the second (strict) inequality holds, consider first the case p ≤ λ+2
λ+3 so
α(p, λ) = λ+12 . Then, we have θHB(p,λ) −θL λ+12 ≥ θHβ(p, λ)−θLα(p, λ) > 0, where
the second inequality holds since λ < λS . Consider next the case p ≥ λ+2λ+3 > 12 .
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B(p,λ) − θL λ+12 > θH − θL λ+12 > 0 since
λ < λS < λ = 2 θHθL − 1 implies θH > θL λ+12 .
In sum, either (88) or (91) must be satisfied.We show that any PPEmenu satisfying






t˜L ≤ t˜H − θLα(p, λ)(vH − vL) < θL
B(p, λ)
vH − θLα(p, λ)(vH − vL), (93)
where the first inequality of (93) is due to (66). But, a higher profit is achieved by
another menu R with the same quantities as in R˜ but different transfers:
tL = θLα(p, λ)vL (94)
tH = tL + θHβ(p, λ)(vH − vL) = θLα(p, λ)vL + θHβ(p, λ)(vH − vL) (95)
Note that R satisfies (66). Also, R satisfies (IRL) and (91) since they can be written
together as tL ≤ θLα(p, λ)vL . Thus, R is a PE screening menu that satisfies the PPE
requirement with respect to RL , RH , and R∅H . Now, using (92) through (95), we
obtain
tH − t˜H > (θHβ(p, λ) − θLα(p, λ))vL +
(
θHβ(p, λ) − θL
B(p, λ)
)
vH > 0 (96)
tL − t˜L > θL
(
α(p, λ) − 1
B(p, λ)
)
vH > 0, (97)
where the last inequalities in (96) and (97) hold since θHβ(p, λ) > θLα(p, λ) ≥
θL
B(p,λ) . Thus, we can focus on (91) to find the optimal menu for [P ′].
Summing up, [P ′] can be solved with (66), (91), and (IRL). Note that the latter two
constraints can be written together as
tL ≤ θLα(p, λ)vL . (98)
Then, the standard argument can be used to establish that (98) and the second inequality
of (66) must hold as equality at the optimal menu that solves [P ′],28 implying that the
transfers satisfy (94) and (95). Plugging them into the profit and taking the FOCs with
respect to qL and qH yield (25) and (26). For a screening menu to be a solution of [P ′],
we need the two qualities that solve (25) and (26) to satisfy qL < qH . This requires
the LHS of (25) to be smaller than that of (26), which yields θHβ(p, λ) > θLα(p, λ)
after rearrangement. This condition is equivalent to requiring λ < λS . unionsq
28 Note that the second inequality of (66) is strict for p > λ+2
λ+3 . Thus, the optimal menu fails to exist for the
reason mentioned in footnote 14. We avoid the nonexistence problem by allowing for the strict inequality
to hold as equality.
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We next show that the optimal menu in Lemma 5 satisfies all other PPE require-
ments.
Lemma 6 If λ < λS, then the optimal menu R that solves [P ′] satisfies the PPE
requirement with respect to all menus in C(R) other than RL, RH , and R∅H .
Proof (i) R′ = R∅ = {∅,∅}: We consider two cases, p ≥ 1
λ+3 or p <
1
λ+3 . In the
former case, R and R∅ with transfers as in (94) and (95) satisfy (FICH ), u(∅|θH , R∅) <
u(bL |θH , R∅), written as tL < θH 2λ+1vL = θHβ(p, λ)vL for p ≥ 1λ+3 . To see this,
given (94), this inequality becomes θLα(p, λ)vL < θHβ(p, λ)vL , which holds since
λ < λS .
When p < 1
λ+3 , we show that R and R
∅ satisfy (U ), U (R) ≥ U (∅) = 0. Write
first the ex ante utility from R as
U (R) = p(θLvL−tL)+(1−p)(θH vH −tH )−p(1−p)(λ−1)(θH vH −θLvL+tH −tL).
(99)
Note that with p < 1
λ+3 , (94) and (95) become
tL = θL λ + 1
2
vL and tH = θL λ + 1
2
vL + θH 1 − p(λ − 1)
1 + p(λ − 1) (vH − vL).
Plug these into (99) to express (U ) as






1 − p(λ − 1)]−θL[1 + 2p2(−1 + λ)+λ − 2pλ]
)
≥ 0.
With p < 1
λ+3 <
1
λ−1 , the expression in the first square bracket is positive and also the










2(1 + p − pλ)
) [
1 − p(λ − 1)]
− θL
[
1 + 2p2(−1 + λ) + λ − 2pλ])
= 1
2
pθLvL(λ − 1)(2 + λ − p(3 + λ)) > 0,




(ii) R′ = R∅L = {∅, bL}: Consider the condition (FICH ), u(bH |θH , R∅L) >
u(bL |θH , R∅L), which can be written as
tH − tL
vH − vL < θH
2
λ + 1 . (100)
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If p > 1
λ+3 , then this condition is satisfied by tL and tH as in (94) and (95) since
tH −tL
vH −vL = θHβ(p, λ) = θH 2λ+1 for p > 1λ+3 .29 Suppose from now that p ≤ 1λ+3 .
We show that (U ), that is, U (R) ≥ U (R∅L), is satisfied. To do so, we obtain after
simplification of terms





1 − 2p(2 + p(λ − 1) − λ)](λ + 1)
+ θL
[ − λ − 1 + p(2 + p(−1 + λ)2 − (−3 + λ)λ)]).
First, we define the expression in the first square bracket as h(p) := 1 − 2p(2 +
p(λ−1)−λ) and show that h(p) > 0 for p ∈ [0, 1
λ+3 ]. Since h is a concave, quadratic
function of p, it suffices to show that both h(0) and h( 1
λ+3 ) are positive: h(0) = 1 > 0
and h( 1
λ+3 ) = 3λ(λ+2)−1(3+λ)2 > 0. Given that h is positive for p ∈ [0, 1λ+3 ], we have





1 − 2p(2 + p(λ − 1) − λ)](λ + 1)
+ θL
[ − λ − 1 + p(2 + p(−1 + λ)2 − (−3 + λ)λ)])
= pθL(λ − 1)(λ + 2 − p(λ + 3)) > 0
if p ≤ 1
λ+3 , as desired.
(iii) R′ = RH L = {bH , bL}: This menu corresponds to a reverse-screening menu
where the high (low) type chooses a bundle with low (high) quality. By Lemma 2, this
menu can only be a PE if θH ≤ θL λ+12 , which contradicts with the assumption that
λ < λS < λ = 2 θHθL − 1.
(iv) R′ = RH∅ = {bH ,∅}: Write (FICL) and (FICH )—that is, u(bH |θL , RH∅) <




1 + (1 − p) + pλ




2θH + p(λ − 1)θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ ,
respectively. One of these two inequalities must hold since
2θH + p(λ − 1)θL
1 + p + (1 − p)λ − θL
1 + (1 − p) + pλ
1 + p + (1 − p)λ =
2(θH − θL)
1 + p + (1 − p)λ > 0.
(v) R′ = RL∅ = {bL ,∅}: The analysis of this case is analogous to the case (iv)
above and thus omitted. unionsq
29 To be precise, the transfers tL and tH in (94) and (95) result from binding the second inequality of (66)
to avoid the nonexistence problem (as mentioned in Remark 14). In fact, for p > 1
λ+3 , that inequality is
strict and corresponds to (62), which is the same as (100).
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